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A House Divided: Party Polarization on Social Welfare Issues
Abstract
Recently, the general public and the media have paid much attention to an increasing polarization on welfare
issues. As Everett Carll Ladd's (1995) survey illustrates in Figure 1, three quarters of the general population
agreed on the role of government in welfare in 1988. However, this consensus had disintegrated into a near
polar split by 1994. Because the U.S. House of Representatives is supposedly most responsive to popular
opinion, the research here uses the House to investigate possible determinants of this trend. I postulate that
not only divided government and the decline of the conservative coalition, but also the "Contract With
America" have contributed to the development of party unity--and its mirror opposite, party polarization--on
welfare issues. I intend to demonstrate three points: (1) the New Deal "conservative coalition" has not
declined, (2) that the unity of both parties has increased after the "Contract With America," and (3) that the
Democrats remain consistently more unified than the Republicans despite the perception that Republicans
are more unified as a result of their"Contract With America."
This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol1/iss1/7
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Recently, tlle general public and the media have paid Illuch attention to
an increw,ing polarization on welfare issues. As Everett Carll Ladd's (1995)
survey illustrates in Figure I, tllree quarters of the general population agreed
on the role of government in welfare in 1988. However, this consensus
Figure 1
Assessing Welfare Programs
1988
1994
1990
Qutstlon: Do you agne or dlSJlgree•.. ,"1t l, lhe
....pon.'lblllty or the governmenllo take .are or
people who can't take care or themselves?"
(41.84~~)
(58.16%)
had disintegrated into a near polar split by 1994. Because the U.S. House of
RepresenL:'1lives is supposedly most responsive to popular opinion, the research
here uses tlle House to investigate possible determinants of tllis trend. I
postulate that not only divided government and the decline of the conservative
coalition, but also the "Contract With America" have contributed to the
development of party unity--and its mirror opposite, party polarization--on
welfare issues. I intend to demonstrate t1lree points: (l) the New Deal
"conservative coalition" has not declined, (2) lhal Ille unity of bolll parties
has increased after the "Contract With America," and (3) that fue Democrats
remain consistently more unified fuan fue Republicans despite fue perception
that Republicans are more unified as a result of fueir"Contract With America."
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Literature Reivew
Much of the current literature implies that divided government and the
decline of conservative coalition votes are correlated with an increase in
party polarization on welfare votes in the House. Divided government has
characterized American politics during much of the last two and one-half
decades (1968-1992), with the executive traditionally dominated by
Republicans and the House by Democrats. Morris P. Fiorina (1991) illustrates
that this trend is demonstrated not only at the federal level, but also at the
state level. Due to this divided government, both parties work to strengthen
their party unity so that they are better able to battle their fierce opposition.
For instance, in the 1970s, the Democrats revised the procedure by which
their Caucus elected committee chairs, thus holding their leaders accountable
to the entire party membership and enforcing party unity. The Republicans
have since responded with resolve to tighten their ranks. As the parties
become more unified and galvanized they leave little room for compromise
or moderate positions. In effect, they become polarized.
As party unity increases, the frequency of conservative coalition votes
may be expected to decline because conservative Southern Democrats who
used to vote with Republicans against Northern Democrats beginning in the
1930s and 1940s, now either vote liberally with their own party or convert to
the Republican party (Cooper and Brady, 1981: 423). Some contend that the
decline of conservative coalition votes is also attributable to the 1965 Voting
Rights Act which enabled larger numbers of black voters to reach the polls,
thus making southern representatives more accountable to the traditionally
liberal segments of their constituencies. But, Fleisher (1993) finds that even
when controlling for such constituency variables, such as increased percentage
of black liberal voters, the Americans for Democratic Acvtion (ADA) and
party unity scores of Northern Democrats still rise. Table 1 demonstrates
this trend from 1981 to 1987. While ADA and party unity scores for Southern
Democrats increased approximately 30 and 23 points respectively, Northern
Democrats increased about 10 points on each set of scores. This emphasizes
the fact that Northern Democrats who were largely unaffected by the increase
in liberal black voters still becoame more liberal for reasons other than the
1965 Voting Rights Act.
Table 2 illustrates this partisan galvanization in both parties. As Bond
and Fleisher (1995) demonstrate, since the Johnson administration in the
1960s, the extremely partisan factions of both parties have increased
approximately thirty points, while the two cross-pressured or moderate
factions have substantially decreased. For these purposes, "cross-pressure"
factions represent those groups who have conflicting and thus less polarized
positions on the issue studied. Rebecca C. Morton (1993) contends that this
polarization is even more likely when Representatives have incomplete
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Table 1
Mean ADA and Party Unity Support Scores Northern and Southern
Democrats 1981-1987
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Southern Democrats
ADA Party Unity
1981 1983 1985 1987 1981 1983 1985 1987
Mean 31 53 45 61 56 66 77 79
Standard Deviation 26 25 21 21 19 20 15 15
N 70 81 72 76 70 81 72 76
Northern Democrats
ADA Party Unity
1981 1983 1985 1987 1981 1983 1985 1987
Mean 76 85
Standard Deviation 23 13
N 167 185
Source: Richard Fleisher, 1993: 332
87 79 83
14 19 13
180 179 167
89 90 91
10 10 10
185 180 179
information regarding voter policy preferences. Because of this party
polarization, Agae Clausen argues that now "party is the best single predictor
of voting" especially on welfare issues (Fishel, 1978: 275).
TheOl'etical Logic
Many authors agree with Clausen that welfare issues produce the greatest
level of party polarization. Indeed, Bond and Fleisher (1995) find that when
Congress voted on domestic issues such as welfare in 1993, Democrats
supported the liberal position 54% of the time--twice that of Republicans.
In other areas, Democrats and Republicans are more likely to support a
moderate position thus indicating a decrease in party polarization as issues
becomes less domestic. Because the positions of Republicans and Democrats
are so divergent on welfare issues, their votes on such issues will probably
by more partisan and polarized. Therefore, divided government and the decline
of (he conservative coalition may exacerbate party polarization on welfare
votes in the House.
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Table 2
Size of the Party Factions, First·Year Majority Presidents
Cross- Cross-
President's Pressured Pressured Opposition
President Base Partisans Opponents Base
House
Eisenhower 201 19 43 170
Kennedy 188 74 31 143
Johnson 203 91 19 121
Carter 223 66 21 124
Clinton 222 36 5 173
Senate
Eisenhower 36 12 13 35
Kennedy 42 22 11 25
Johnson 51 16 4 29
Carter 44 18 12 26
Reagan 43 10 13 34
Clinton 50 7 3 40
Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, "Clinton and Congress: A First-Year Assessment," p. 363.
The "Contract With America" is a product of the Republican party which
represents the culmination of divided government. It not only synthesized
the Republican agenda and promoted party organization, but its portrayal of
a unified force intimidated Democrats. Ladd (1995) notes that, although the
"ContractWith America" includes mostly rules changes for House procedure,
it created the perception that Republicans were unified conservatively on
every front, including welfare. This was accomplished by focusing the chaos
of the 1994 Republican House takeover into a scheduled legislative agenda.
The "Contract With America" publicized the Republicans' position on many
issues, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich successfully brought these issues
to a floor vote as promised. This organization was especially impressive
considering that Republicans had not been in positions of chamber leadership
for many decades, and that 32% of their party were freshman (Ornstein and
Schenkenberg, 1995: 187). Due to the importance of the "Contract With
America" and its role in the Republican takeover, this study investigates the
years immediately before and after the event.
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The success of this type of initiative by the Republican leadership reflects
high party unity. Indeed, according to Cooper and Brady (1981), the "impact
of institutional context on leadership behavior is primarily determined by
party strength." The "Contract With America" highlights the trend of
increasing party unity in the House. According to Charles O. Jones (1968),
the Republicans historically attained success in this endeavor precisely
because they parlayed their electoral majority into a procedural majority or
"those necessary to organize the House for business" as well as the substantive
majority or "those necessasry to pass legislation."
Ornstein and Schenkenburg (1995) further point out that the Republicans'
small majority of 230 requires them to maintain cohesiveness in order to
fulfill the agenda promised in the "Contract With America" (Ornstein and
Schenkenberg, 1995). Jones' description of the Cannon Speakership of the
early 1900s also applies to the mentality required to sustain the high degree
of partisanship today: "Those members who reject the party leadership are
rejecting the Republican party and its mandate from the people to manage
the House and its work" (Jones, 1968). This trend of ever-tightening party
unity resembles that of an arms race, with each side attempting to out-do the
other until eventually they galvanize into diametric oppoision with no room
for moderate positions. Therefore, divided government and increased party
unity culminating in the "Contract With America" may indicate increased
party polarization on welfare votes.
However, these national-level explanations for increased party
polarization can miss the broader picture. Fiornia (1991: 646) points this
out when he contends that "trends in state elections parallel to those in national
elections raise suspicions that more general forces are at work and that existing
explanations of divided government may be too level-specific." National-
level explanations in the American context also fail to account for party
polarization more generally. For instance, if divided national government
indicates polarization, then why does polarization occur in parliamentary
systems such as England where divided government does not occur? This
research acknowledges these facts and therefore merely attempts to identify
possible causal factors at the national level only.
Methodology
This study covers the 103rd and 104th Congresses which come directly
before and after the Republican takeover of the House and the "Contract
With America." For, if polarization were ever to occur, it would be at this
juncture. The unit of analysis used will be House roll-call votes from 1993
to 1995. For the purposes of this study, welfare votes consist of partisan
votes on issues like hunger, homelessness, Health and Human Services, as
well as entitlements including Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), Aid to
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Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income, Medicare,
and Medicaid. But they do not include abortion, veterans' benefits, Housing
and Urban Development, or procedural votes.
Procedural votes do not always reflect the actual conservative of liberal
position of the House member. For instance, a Democrat may be in favor of
a liberal welfare bill, but if the Republican Rules Committee members impose
restricting debate and amending procedures, then the Democrat will be forced
to vote against the bill. It appears, then, that the Democrat has voted against
the liberal welfare bill when in actuality she has voted against the conservative
rules parameters.
Three votes were chosen for each year of the study, culminating in a
total of six votes for the 103rd Congress and three votes for the 104th Congress.
Those for the 103rd Congress are as follows.
1993
HR920:
HR2518:
HR3167:
1994
HR4606:
HR8:
HR4604:
Exempting unemployment compensation extensions from
pay-as-you-go restrictions
Appropriating funds for Health and Human Services
Extending unemployment services
Appropriating funds for Health and Human Services
Re-authorizing WIC, school lunch, and other nutrition
programs until 1998
Establishing procedures for controlling entitlement
expenditures
Unfortunately, HR4606 and HR8 were ultimately dropped from the study
because a majority of Democrats voted with a majority of Repubicans,
therefore violating the requirements of a party unity vote. This results in a
total of 4 votes for the 103rd Congress. Those votes selected from the l04th
Congress are as follows.
1995
HR4:
HR1976:
HR2425:
Overhauling the welfare program
Capping participation in the WIC program
Establishing procedures for controlling entitlement
expenditures.
The Representatives' positions on these votes are recorded in SPSS along
with their party and region. Every liberal vote is scored as a 1 and every
conservative vote is scored as a 0, thus establishing a welfare index. If a
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representative voted liberally on every issues in the 103rd Congress, she
receives a score of 4 because the maximum liberal score is 4.0 for the 103rd
Congress and 3.0 for the l04th Congress. TIle most conservative score for
both Congresses is 0.0
Data Analysis
In the 103rd Congress, conservative coalition levels were very low.
Congressional Quarterly reports that for the House alone, the conservative
coalition existed on 44 out of 597 votes in 1993 and 36 out of 497 votes in
1994 to equal a 7% appearance (Almanac, 1994).
As demonstrated by the following tables, the level of party polarization
was as high as tIle conservative coalition scores were low. Table 3 shows
Table 3
HR920 Unemployment Compensation 1993
Republican
Conservative
Unemployment
vote
Liberal
Unemployment
Total
84.43
15.6%
167 (40.2%)
Democrat
8.9%
91.1%
248 (59.8%)
Total
163
252
60.7%
415 (100%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V=.75, Significant at .01)
that votes on HR920 resulted in 91.1 % of Democrats voting liberally and
opposing 84.4% of Republicans voting conservatively. More Republicans
than Democrats defected. Table 4 shows a similar pattern for HR2518 with
93% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing only two-thirds of
Republicans who voted conservatively.
Table 4
HR2518 Health and Human Services 1993
Conservative
HHS Approp. 62.1% 7.0%
vote
Liberal
HHS Approp.
vote 37.9% 93.0%
Total 169 (39.8%) 256 (60.2%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.59, significant at .01.
Republican Democrat Total
123
28.9%
302
71.1%
425 (100%)
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Likewise, in Table 5 HR3167 saw 92.8% of Democrats voting liberally and
opposing only about half of Republicans voting conservatively. HR2518 with
93% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing only two-thirds of
Republicans who voted conservatively. Likewise in Table 5, HR3167 saw
92.8% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing only about half of
Table 5
HR3167 Unemployment Services 1993
Republican Democrat Total
Conservative 96
Unemploy. ext 50.3% 7.2% 24.4%
vote
Liberal 297
Unemploy. ext 49.7% 92.8% 75.6%
vote
Total 157 (39.9%) 236 (30.0%) 393 (100%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.49. significant at .0.1.
Republicans voting conservatively. Table 6 illustrates the same thing for
1994: 94.4% of Democrats voted liberally and again opposed about half of
Republicans who voted conservatively. These findings show that party unity
for Democrats was very high, usually approximating a 9 to 1 ratio of party
supporters to party defectors. However, Republicans were not as unified.
Table 6
HR4604 Health and Human Services 1994
Republican Democrat Total
Conservative 107
Entitlement 55.7% 5.6% 25.5%
Vote
Liberal 312
Entitlement 44.3% 94.4% 74.5%
Vote
Total 167 (39.9%) 252 (60.1%) 419 (100%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.56. significant at .01.
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with their highest ratio approximating 8 to 2 and falling aslow as I to 1.
Finally, the indices for the 103rd Congress are displayed in Table 7. The
number of Democrats who always voted liberally were nearly 3.5 times greater
than the number of Republicans who always voted conservatively. But, the
two most conservative categories only equal 23.9% while the two most liberal
categories equal 66.4%. All of these tables are statistically significant at the
.01 level.
Table 7
Indices for the 103rd Congress
Index
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Significant at .01.
Republican
28.2%
30.2%
18.8%
15.4%
7.4%
Democrat
0.0%
0.9%
3.6%
18.8%
76.7%
Total
11.3% (42)
12.6% (47)
9.7% (36)
17.5% (65)
48.9% (182)
As of 25 November 1995, the conservative coalition existed on 102 out of
821 House votes for the l04th Congress, or 12.4%. This is obviously higher
than the 7% for the 103rd Congress. Even though these figures contradict
the theoretical logic by showing an increase rather than a decrease in the
appearance of the conservative coalition thus far, the l04th Congress still
demonstrates more party polarization than that of the 103rd Congress.
The results for HR1976 in Table 8 echo those of the 103rd Congress with
99.5% Democrats voting liberally and opposing only 64.3% of Republican
who voted conservatively.
Table 8
HR1976 WIC Program 1995
Conservative
WIC Cap 64.3% 0.5%
Vote
Liberal
WIC Cap 35.7% 99.5%
Total 227 (53.7%) 196 (46.3%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer sV)=.66, significant at .01.
Republican Democrat Total
147
34.8%
276
65.2%
423 (100%)
36
Virtually no Democrats, but nearly a third of Republicans defected. But, for
HR4 in Table 9,95.5% of Democrats voted liberally and opposed 96.6% of
Republicans who voted conservatively. HR2425 in Table 10 is also highly
polarized
Table 9
HR4 Welfare Overhaul 1995
Republican Democrat Total
Conservative 234
Welfare 96.6% 4.5% 54%
Vote
Liberal 199
Welfare 3.4% 95.5% 46%
Vote
Total 233 (53.6%) 200 (46.2%) 433 (100%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.92, significant at .01.
with 97.5% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 97% of Republicans
voting conservatively. Finally, the indices for the l04th Congress are located
in Table 11. A far greater percentage of Republicans were strictly conservative
than in the 103rd Congress with 61.7% voting conservatively here.
Table 10
HR2425 Entitlement Expenditures 1995
Conservative
Medicare 97% 2.5%
Vote
Liberal
Medicare 3% 97.5%
Vote
Total 233 (53.9%) 199 (46.1%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.94, significant at .01
Republican Democrat Total
231
53.5%
201
46.5%
433 (100%)
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Table 11
Indices for the l04th Congress
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3.00 0.4% 93.8%
227 (54.2%) 192 (45.8%)
Chi Square Measure (Cramer sV)=.96, significant at .01.
0.00
1.00
2.00
Republican
61.7%
35.2%
2.6%
Democrat
0.0%
1.0%
5.2%
Total
140
33.4%
82
19.6%
16
3.8%
181
43.2%
419 (100%)
Democrats remained high in the strictly liberal category with 93.8%. However,
this time the scales are more polarized with 53% in the two most conservative
categories and 47% in the two most liberal categories. Obviously, these votes
are not necessarily representative of all votes, but they are consistent with the
Congressional Quarterly's General Report and its statistics on party unity
and partisanship for the first session of the l04th Congress.
The conservative coalition scores do not resonate with the theoretical
logic. To date, the scores have risen approximately five points in the House
from the 103rd to the l04th Congresses. Even though this time frame is only
a snapshot of a long-term trend of polarization, the data here shows that
increased party polarization is not necessarily determined by a decrease in
conservative coalition votes. However, this increase in conservative coalition
votes may be due to the fact that it measures all conservative coalition votes,
not just those on welfare issues. Despite these findings, other components of
the theoretical logic have not been disproven. In fact, party polarization on
these welfare votes increased after the "Contract With America" and the
Republican takeover of the House. The Democrats maintain a higher degree
of party unity than Republicans on these welfare votes both in the 103rd
Congress when they held the majority as well as in the l04th Congress when
they were in the minority. They consistently had approximately 90% party
unity and very few defectors. This is underscored by the heavily-weighted
liberal indices for Democrats in both Congresses.
The Republicans became more unified in the l04th Congress when they
held the majority as compared to their divisiveness in the 103rd Congress
when in the minority. Their party unity rose from nearly 50% in the 103rd
Congress to reach above 90% for two out of the three votes in the l04th
Congress. They were never as heavily weighted toward conservatism as
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Democrats were toward liberalism on the welfare indices. But, because both
parties became more unified, they left little room for moderate positions or
compromise, thus increasing party polarization.
A regional analysis of the data reveals a similar pattern. Table 12 in the
Appendix indicates that all regions were weighted toward the liberal end of
the index, but the Northeast and East regions had the highest liberal to
conservative index ratio with the two most liberal and the two most
conservative categories equalling approximately 8:2. Conversely, the Midwest
showed the most conservative index for the 103rd Congress with an
approximate 1:1 ratio. The Southwest and East were ultimately dropped
from the individual regional analysis due to their low sample size.
In the individual regional examination, Table 13 reveals that in the South,
Republicans were split with the two most liberal categories equalling 14.6%
and the two most conservative equalling 65.9%, but the Democrats were a
little more galvanized with the liberal categories totaling 71.5% and
conservative totaling 2.9%. The West is a bit more unified for Republicans
with the liberal faction totaling 10% and the conservative end of the index
equalling 79%. Democrats are again very unified with all votes in the two
most liberal index categories. The Northeast, displayed in Table 15, again
shows more unity by Democrats than Republicans with all Democrats in
most liberal categories and even Republicans weighted toward the liberal
end of the index. Finally, Table 16 shows great polarization in the Midwest
with 65% of Republicans in the two most conservative categories and all
Democrats in the most liberal categories. All of these cross-tabulations are
statistically significant at the .01 level.
Tables 17 through 21 display the regional findings for the l04th Congress.
The overall regional analysis indicates more polarization than in the 103rd
Congress: this time, the Northeast and East are liberally-dominated, the West
is split down the middle, and the South and Southwest are conservatively-
dominated. Once again, the Southwest and East are dropped from the
individual examination due to their low sample size.
The remaining regions show higher party polarization than those of the
103rd Congress, supporting the theoretical logic that party polarization may
be indicated by divided government and the "Contract With America." Table
18 shows the complete unity of Southern Republicans with all in the two
most conservative index categories. Unusually, this time Democrats are the
least unified with all but 3.3% in the two most liberal categories. Table 19
indicates the polarization of the West with almost all Republicans in the two
most conservative categories and all Democrats in the two most liberal
categories. In the Northeast in Table 20, all Democrats were once again in
the two most liberal categories, while the Republicans had only 88.9% in the
two most conservative categories. Finally, in the Midwest, Table 21 indicates
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another complete polar split. Thus, not only is the general regional analysis
more polarized in the 104th Congress, so are the individual regions of the
South, West, Northeast, and Midwest. The Democrats are unified in every
region for both Congresses, but the Republicans show a marked increase in
unity, moving from moderate splits in the 103rd Congress to near absolute
unity in all regions for the 104th Congress, thus augmenting party polarization
on welfare issues.
Conclusion
The degree of partisanship demonstrated by the House after the "Contract
With America" does increase despite the fact that conservative coalition
scores increase rather than decrease as expected. But, even though divided
government and the "Contract With America" may indicate party
galvanization, Republicans do not show the same degree of partisanship on
these welfare votes as Democrats either by region or as a whole. This
contradicts the perception that the Republican party is a disciplined
juggernaught that remains unified under all circumstances. Apparently, the
perception that the "Contract With America" is the ultimate unifying force
for the ultimately unified party is mistaken. For, it is the Dernocrats, and not
the Republicans who show the most cohesiveness in these particular instances.
Further Expansion
This research design can be expanded into at least two directions. It
could test the theory forwarded by Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright in
"Voters, Candidates, and Issues In Congressional Elections" that the most
moderate Representatives come from the most marginal districts and the most
extreme Representatives come from the safest districts. In accordance with
that theory, the design could investigate whether or not the Representatives
from the most marginal districts have the most moderate positions on welfare
issues, and the Representatives with the greatest chance of getting re-elected
easily have the most extreme positions on such issues. Another option is to
expand this longitudinal study laterally to compare the votes of Representatives
on foreign policy and budget issues to those on welfare for the 103rd and
104th Congresses to see if welfare votes truly are more polarized than other
types of votes.
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Appendix
Table 12
The 103rd Congress
Index South Southwest West Northeast Midwest East Total
0.0 13.5% 14.3% 9.2% 3.7% 17.4% 9.1% 11.3% 42
1.0 12.6% .0% 22.4% 6.2% 12.8% .0% 12.6% 47
2.0 10.8% 14.3% 3.9% 7.4% 15.1% 9.1% 9.7% 36
3.0 22.5% 14.3% 18.4% 19.8% 7.0% 27.3% 17.5% 65
4.0 40.5% 57.1% 46.1% 63.0% 47.7% 54.5% 48.9% 182
Total 29.8% 1.9% 20.4% 21.8% 23.1% 3.0% 100%
111 7 76 81 86 11 372
Table 13
The South
Index Republican Democrat Total
0.0 36.6% .0% 13.5% 15
1.0 29.3% 2.9% 12.6% 14
2.0 19.5% 5.7% 10.8% 12
3.0 12.2% 28.6% 22.5% 25
4.0 2.4% 62.9% 40.5% 45
Total 41 (36.9%) 70 (63.1%) 111 (100%)
Significance = .01
Table 14
The West
Index Republican Democrat Total
0.0 23.3% .0% 9.2% 7
1.0 56.7% .0% 22.4% 17
2.0 10.0% .0% 3.9% 3
3.0 6.7% 26.1% 18.4% 14
4.0 3.3% 73.9% 46.1% 35
Total 30 (39.5%) 46 (60.5%) 76 (100%)
Significance = .01
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Table 15
The Northeast
Index Republican Democrat Total
0.0 9.4% .0% 3.7% 3
1.0 15.6% .0% 6.2% 5
2.0 18.8% .0% 7.4% 6
4.0 21.9% 89.8% 63.0% 51
Total 32 (39.5%) 49 (60.5%) 81 (100%)
Significance = .01
Table 16
The Midwest
Index Republican Democrat Total
0.0 37.5% .0% 17.4% 15
1.0 27.5% .0% 12.8% 11
2.0 25.0% 6.5% 15.1% 13
3.0 7.5% 6.5% 7.0% 6
4.0 2.5% 87.0% 47.7% 41
Total 40 (46.5%) 46 (53.5%) 86 (100%)
Significance = .01
Table 17
The l04th Congress
Index South Southwest West Northeast Midwest East Total
0.0 38.8% 60.0% 40.0% 18.1% 34.4% 20.0% 33.4%140
1.0 17.9% 20.0% 12.0% 24.5% 24.0% 10.0% 19.6% 82
2.0 3.7% .0% 2.7% 6.4% 2.1% 10.0% 3.8% 16
3.0 39.6% 20.0% 45.3% 51.1% 39.6% 60.0% 43.2%181
Total 32.0% 2.4% 17.9% 22.4% 22.9% 2.4%100.0%
134 10 75 94 96 10 419
Significance = .01
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Table 18
The South
Index Republican Democrat Total
0.0 70.3% .0% 38.8% 52
1.0 29.7% 3.3% 17.9% 24
2.0 .0% 8.3% 3.7% 5
3.0 .0% 88.3% 39.6% 53
Total 74 (55.2%) 60 (44.8%) 134 (100%)
Significance =.01
Table 19
The West
Index Republican Democrat Total
0.0 75.0% .0% 40.0% 30
1.0 22.5% 0.0% 12.0% 0
2.0 2.5% 2.9% 2.7% 2
3.0 .0% 97.1% 45.3% 34
Total 40 (53.3%) 35 (46.7%) 75 (100%)
Significance =.01
Table 20
The Northeast
Index Republican Democrat Total
0.0 37.8% .0% 18.1% 17
1.0 51.1% .0% 24.5% 23
2.0 8.9% 4.1% 6.4% 6
3.0 2.2% 95.9% 51.1% 48
Total 45 (47.9%) 49 (52.1%) 94 (100%)
Significance =.01
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Tahle 21
The Midwest
Significance =.01
Index
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
Total
Republican
58.9%
41.1%
.0%
.0%
56 (58.3%)
Democrat
.0%
.0%
5.0%
95.0%
40 (41.7%)
Total
34.4%
24.0% 23
2.1% 2
39.6% 38
96 (100%)
